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CASES NOTED
THE ABORTION DECISION: RIGHT OF
PRIVACY EXTENDED
Jane Roe,' who was unmarried and pregnant,2 sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from the effect of Texas statutes prohibiting abor-
tions in all cases except those in which the woman's life was endangered. 3
Unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas, and unable to afford an abor-
tion elsewhere, she brought a class action in which she alleged that the
Texas statutes were vague, unconstitutional on their face, and an abridg-
ment of her constitutional right of privacy under the first, fourth, fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments. The action4 was heard by the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas (sitting as a three-judge
panel) which granted declaratory relief, holding that the fundamental
rights of single and married women to choose whether to beget children
are protected by the ninth amendment via the fourteenth, and that the
Texas statutes were void as an infringement upon those rights. The court
dismissed the application for injunctive relief.5 On appeal,6 the United
States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision held, affirmed:" The Texas
statutes abridged Roe's fourteenth amendment right of privacy. However,
the state has legitimate interests in the abortion decision which attach.
at various stages of pregnancy so that: (1) for the stage of pregnancy
prior to the end of the first trimester the abortion decision is solely within
the discretion of the pregnant woman and her physician; (2) for the stage
subsequent to the first trimester, the state, in furtherance of its interest
in the health of the female, may regulate the abortion procedure in any
manner that is reasonably related to her health; and (3) for the stage
subsequent to viability,8 the state, in furtherance of its interest in the
1. The name is a pseudonym.
2. See note 46 infra & accompanying text.
3. TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. arts. 1191-94 & 1196 (1961). These statutes, which had re-
mained essentially unchanged since 1898, are typical of the abortion statutes enacted by
many states in the mid-nineteenth century, which are still in effect in twenty-one states
today. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 738 n.1 (1973) (dissent).
4. A licensed physician, who had two criminal abortion prosecutions pending against
him, was permitted to intervene. The district court simultaneously entertained an action by
a couple who also sought to attack the Texas statutes despite the fact that the woman was
not yet pregnant. The district court held that the couple failed to present a justiciable con-
troversy, and proceeded to the merits as to Roe and the physician only. Roe v. Wade, 314
F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
5. Id. at 1224. The Supreme Court later declined decision on the injunction issue,
stating that they assumed the Texas authorities would follow the Wade decision thereby
making a decision on injunctive relief unnecessary. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 733 (1973).
6. The appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966).
7. The Supreme Court held that the physician did not have standing to sue and reversed
the district court on that point. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 714 (1973).
8. Viability is that point in fetal development (occurring from 24 to 28 weeks) when
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"potentiality of human life" may regulate and even proscribe abortion
except when necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
female. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). 0
At common law an abortion performed before quickening, the first
movement of the fetus felt by the mother, 10 was not a criminal offense."
Lord Coke, however, stated that the abortion of a woman "quick with
childe . . . [was] a great misprision . .. Subsequent to Coke's pro-
nouncement, virtually every court confronted with the abortion question
has distinguished between pre-quickening and post-quickening abortion,
holding only the latter to be criminal. 13 One legal scholar, after examining
the cases relied upon by Coke, has stated that Coke, in all probability,
misstated the law of his time.1 4 Consequently, at common law, it is doubt-
ful that abortion should have been a crime at all, regardless of the devel-
opment of the fetus.1 5 Therefore, since all of the states (except Louisiana)
have adopted the English common law, it has been argued, that until
state legislatures began to enact statutes proscribing abortion, a woman
had an unqualified right to abort at any stage of pregnancy. Viewed in
this light, the Wade decision, instead of representing a radical new ap-
proach to the abortion issue, can be construed to represent a moderate
step backwards I
It is well established that there is a fundamental right of privacy
which exists within the Constitution though not expressly enunciated
therein.16 The right of personal privacy" has been held to arise from
the fetus is capable of living outside of the womb, albeit with artificial aid. L. HFra sA
& J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971).
9. In Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973), a companion of Roe v. Wade, several
Georgia abortion statutes were challenged on grounds similar to those pleaded in Wade.
The Georgia statutes, in contrast to the Texas statutes, represented a more modem approach
to abortion, being fashioned after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) which is set out in Appendix B of the opinion. Id. at 754. The Supreme Court
closely scrutinized the various regulations contained in the Georgia laws and found most
of the regulations to be overly broad and therefore unconstitutional. The Georgia statutes,
as judicially amended, are set out in Appendix A. Id. at 752.
10. 20 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1261 (24th ed. 1965) (quickening
usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy).
11. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 3, f. 23, pl. 18 (1327). See Means, The Phoenix
of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About to Arise From
the Ninteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?,
17 N.Y.L. FoRUM 335, 337 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Means].
12. E. COKE, INSTITUTES 50-51 (1648).
13. See, e.g., Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972).
14. Means, supra note 11 at 345-48, stating that Coke probably misstated the law
intentionally.
15. 93 S. Ct. at 718.
16. 93 S. Ct. at 726 (citations omitted). As early as 1891, the Court stated that:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
17. As expressed by the Wade Court, "only personal rights that can be deemed 'funda-
mental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy." 93 S. Ct. at 726 (citations omitted).
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diverse sources within the Bill of Rights, the source depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case under consideration. More impor-
tantly, such a right has been found to exist in several contexts concerning
the family milieu. 8
The fountainhead upon which virtually all of the abortion cases have
relied is Griswold v. Connecticut.9 In Griswold, the Supreme Court
struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the dissemination of infor-
mation and the giving of advice and instruction concerning contraception.
The Court held the statute to be violative of couples' rights of marital
privacy, including the right to determine for themselves whether to use
contraceptives. The Griswold "doctrine" was extended in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,20 wherein the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute which
permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives but which denied the
same right to single persons. The Court held that there exists a funda-
mental right of privacy which "is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."'" The Wade Court, after discussing the right of privacy
as enunciated in Griswold and Eisenstadt, extended the principle of those
cases to the abortion decision, concluding that the "right to privacy...
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate
her pregnancy.
' 2
Prior to Wade, the state and federal courts were split on the abortion
issue. Approximately one-half upheld the state abortion statutes under
review, while the other half invalidated the statutes in question.23 Those
courts that chose to uphold the statutes did so on one of two grounds:
that the right of privacy as enunciated by Griswold did not extend to
the abortion question, or, assuming that it did, that the state has a legiti-
mate and compelling interest in preserving the life of the mother and that
of the fetus, entitling it to regulate or even proscribe abortion.24
Virtually all of these courts accepted the principle of privacy, as
18. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Griswold].
20. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Eisenstadt].
21. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
22. 93 S. Ct. at 727. Prior to the Wade decision, many state and federal courts held
that this right of privacy existed within the ninth amendment, while other courts relied
on the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Compare Crossen v. Attorney General,
344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972) with Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972).
See also YWCA v. Kugler 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1072 (D.N.J. 1972). The Wade Court held
that the right of privacy, with respect to the abortion question, lies within fourteenth
amendment due process thereby resolving the conflict. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
23. 93 S. Ct. at 727-28 and cases cited therein. E.g., Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385
(N.D. Ill. 1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
24. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Cheaney v. State-
Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972).
1973]
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enunciated in Griswold and Eisenstadt; nevertheless, extension of the
doctrine was resisted when applied to the particular abortion case under
consideration on the ground that there was a basic distinction between
contraception on one hand and abortion on the other. For example, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in State v. Munson,25 that "[t] here
is a fundamental difference between the right to use contraceptives and
the right to terminate a pregnancy."26 In Cheaney v. State,27 the Supreme
Court of Indiana declared, though in a somewhat different context, that:
The existence of an unborn child distinguishes this case from
Griswold v. Connecticut or Eisenstadt v. Baird. Those cases
involved the right to receive contraceptives while this case in-
volves abortion, the fundamental distinction being the difference
between prevention and destruction.25
The Wade Court did not detail its reasons for making this extension,
other than to state that the right was "broad enough."
The most difficult issue confronting the Wade Court was whether
the state's compelling interest in abortion outweighed the pregnant
woman's right of privacy. It was this issue which had created the great-
est controversy among the lower courts.29 After examining the lower
court cases, the Wade Court concluded that a pregnant woman's right
of privacy to determine whether to abort was not absolute. Instead, it
found that it was a qualified right, inasmuch as it must be balanced
against the state's interest in abortion generally. The Court first found
that the state has two "separate and distinct" interests in abortion: one
being its interest in the preservation of the life and health of the pregnant
woman; the other being its interest in the preservation of fetal life. The
Court then determined that it was not enough for the state to demonstrate
that its interests were merely legitimate; instead the state was required
to establish that its interests were "compelling" before it would be allowed
to interfere with a woman's right to abort."0 Therefore, there arose in
Wade the narrow issue: At what stage of pregnancy, if at all, does the
25. 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972).
26. Id. at 667, 201 N.W.2d 125.
27. - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972).
28. ld. at 269 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
29. Compare Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972) with People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
30. In his dissent Mr. Justice Rehnquist vigorously challenged the majority's reliance
on the "compelling state interest test," asserting that this test is one which has been tradi-
tionally applied to equal protection cases, whereas the "rational relation test" has been
the test traditionally applied to substantive due process cases. Justice Rehnquist concluded
that:
Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the 'compelling
state interest test,' the Court's opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible
feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it.
93 S. Ct. at 737. However, there is authority to the effect that when fundamental personal
rights are at stake, the more stringent "compelling state interest test" is required even in
substantive due process cases. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
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state's interest in abortion become compelling? It was precisely on this
point that the Court decided to effect a compromise,8' labeling it the
"trimester plan."
With respect to the state's interest in the life and health of the
woman, the Court held that the "compelling point" attaches after the end
of the first trimester of pregnancy. After examining recent medical data
purporting to establish that for the first several weeks of pregnancy,
abortion is medically safer than childbirth, 2 the Court concluded that
during the first trimester the state may not interfere with the woman's
right to abort.3 3 However, for the stages subsequent to the end of the first
trimester, the Court held that the state may regulate abortion procedures
in any manner rationally related to the preservation of the woman's life
or health. Such regulation can include licensing and other qualification
standards for both the person who performs an abortion and the facilities
in which it may be performed. 4
With respect to the state's interest in fetal life, however, the Court
was faced with a much more sensitive and hotly debated issue. After
initially refusing to decide when life begins,35 the Court characterized
the fetus as "potential life" and held that viability is the stage at which
the state's interest in the fetus becomes compelling. The Court reasoned
that viability is the logical choice, stating "[t]his is so because the fetus
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside of the
mother's womb.' 36 The Court then concluded that "[s]tate regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological
justifications.137 The result of this holding is that the state may proscribe
31. Jane Roe argued that her right to terminate her pregnancy was absolute so that
she could abort whenever she alone desired, whereas Texas argued that it had a compelling
interest in the fetus from conception, so that it could proscribe abortion from the outset.
32. Tietze, Morality With Contraception and Induced Abortion, 45 SaDIES IN FAMY
PLANNING 6 (1969) (stating that today early-pregnancy abortion is as much as seven times
safer than childbirth).
33. Even though the Court held that the state cannot interfere with a woman's
decision, it recognized that the decision is still primarily a medical one, requiring the consent
of the woman's physician in all cases.
34. The examples given by the Wade Court have proven to be somewhat illusory when
considered in light of the treatment afforded a Georgia statute in Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct.
739 (1973). Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to Wade, held the following statutory regula-
tions of abortion procedure to be invalid under fourteenth amendment due process standards:
(1) the requirement that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals;
(2) the requirement that the woman's physician obtain two concurring opinions
before performing the abortion;
(3) the requirement that the woman's physician obtain the approval of the
hospital's abortion committee; and
(4) the residency requirement.
Id. at 748.
35. 93 S. Ct. at 730. The Court confused the issue however, by implying that life
does not begin until live birth.
36. 93 S. Ct. at 732 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
1973)
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abortion only subsequent to viability (during the third trimester) except
when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 8
In contrast to the Supreme Court's analysis, the majority of lower
courts which have upheld state abortion statutes have done so on the
ground that the state has a compelling interest in fetal life from the
moment of conception. Although few courts were willing to assert that
a fetus (especially in early development) is a human life in the traditional
sense, many courts recognize that some form of "potential life" or "unique
physical entity" exists from the moment of conception. 40 For example, in
Cheaney v. State,4' the court held that the state's interest in fetal life
becomes compelling at conception in that
[i]t is now established that some sort of independent life begins
at conception ... [so that] . . . "biologically as well as ethically
the only logical and satisfactory view of the embryo is to regard
it as a human being from the outset. 42
On the other hand, several courts have disregarded this "conception
argument." They have instead chosen to rely upon tort concepts,43 or
upon the bare assertion that the mother's right to abort simply out-
weighed the right of the fetus to exist.44
The abortion controversy has been characterized by one court as
"an explosive mixture of medical, moral, social, and religious issues and
concepts. 45 Yet, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court chose to decide the
merits of the case recognizing that whatever its decision, it would be
subjected to storms of criticism. The result, of course, was the compromise
"trimester plan." No doubt, constitutional scholars will cringe (as did
Justice Rehnquist) at the Court's broad trimester scheme, promulgated
in a case devoid of any facts as to the stage of pregnancy to which
Jane Roe had advanced when her suit was commenced.46 Perhaps not
38. It is important to distinguish between characterizing a fetus as a human life, and
characterizing a fetus as a "person." The court expressly rejected the argument that a fetus
is a "person" in the Constitutional sense, thereby having fourteenth amendment due process
rights of its own. 93 S. Ct. at 729 & n.54.
39. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Cheaney v. State, -
Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972).
See Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 233, 240 (1969).
40. E.g., Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
41. - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972).
42. Id. at 268.
43. See, e.g., YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1075 (D.N.J. 1972).
44. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S.
1 (1970).
45. State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 671, 201 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1972).
46. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist observed, the Court departed from the well-established
precedent that the Court will never create a rule broader than necessary, based on the facts
in the record before it. Since there was nothing in the record indicating to what stage of
pregnancy Jane Roe had progressed at the time her suit was commenced, there was no
factual basis for the "trimester plan." 93 S. Ct. 736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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since Miranda v. Arizona47 has the Court been so vigorously accused of
judicial legislation. However, in spite of the opinion's technical infirmities,




Defendants offered for sale to the public unique forms of self-im-
provement courses called "Adventures" and "Plans." In return for an
investment of from one to five thousand dollars, purchasers received
certain promotional materials, the opportunity to attend group seminars,
and the right to enroll in a training course--all of which were geared to
indoctrinating purchasers in the technique of selling "Dare To Be Great"
courses to others. After completion of the training course, purchasers
became "independent sales trainees," eligible to earn commissions from
sales made by defendants to individuals whom the purchaser had brought
to the "Adventure Meetings." The Securities and Exchange Commission
sought to enjoin defendants from offering these schemes for sale, claiming
violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The Commission
charged that these courses were part of a pyramid promotional sales plan
which constituted an investment contract and, as such, a security within
the meaning of the federal securities laws.8 The Commission likened de-
fendant to a double-level franchising operation in which the success of
each individual franchisee is inextricably tied to the success of the entire
franchising system.' Unless investors are given the opportunity to exercise
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the entire
enterprise, the Commission argued, such investors should be afforded
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(g), (j), (k), (q), (t), (w) (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(c), (1), (r), (u), (z) (1970).
3. The Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, c9lateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
defines "security" in virtually the same language. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (a) (10) (1970).
4. See Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-Level Distributorship and Pyramid
Sales Plans, SEC Securities Act Release, No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971).
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